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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RESUMPTION OF
QUESTIONING AFTER RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT
HAS BEEN EXERCISED
In Michigan v. Mosley' the United States Supreme Court broadly held
that the admissibility of statements obtained after a person in custody has
decided to remain silent depends, under Miranda v. Arizona,2 on whether
his "right to cut off questioning" was "scrupulously honored." ' The Court
held: where an interrogation is immediately ceased when a fully informed
suspect exercises his right to remain silent; a significant lapse of time
passes before questioning is resumed; a fresh set of warnings is provided;
and the questioning concerns an offense unrelated to the subject of the
prior interrogation, then the defendant's right to cut off questioning has
been so honored and, therefore, any statement obtained in the latter interrogation is admissible as evidence against the suspect at trial.,
Mosley was arrested in connection with certain robberies in Detroit,
Michigan, and after his arrest, was advised of his constitutional rights in
accordance with the Miranda decision.5 He read and signed the police
department's constitutional rights notification certificate. Upon
commencement of the interrogation about the robberies, Mosley exercised
his right to remain silent and the questioning was promptly ceased. After
approximately two hours of incarceration, Mosley was questioned by a
different officer regarding a robbery and fatal shooting which had taken
place prior in time to the robberies which resulted in his arrest.' He had
not been charged with that offense, nor had he been previously questioned
concerning it. At the outset of the second interrogation, Mosley was again
advised of his Miranda rights and he again read and signed the notification
form. During the course of the latter interrogation,7 he made a statement
implicating himself in the homicide and subsequently was charged with
first degree murder.
A defense motion to suppress the incriminating statement was denied
by the trial court and the statement was introduced in evidence at Mos1.

__

U.S.

-,

96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975).

2. 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
, 96 S.Ct. at 326, 46 L.Ed.2d at 321.
3. __
U.S. at ,96 S.Ct. at 327-28, 46 L.Ed.2d at 323.
4. Id. at 5. The warnings must inform the person in custody "that he has a right to remain silent,
that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a
right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct.
at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 706-07.
6. The record did not make clear how much the officer knew about the earlier interrogation. __
U.S. at -, 96 S.Ct. at 327, 46 L.Ed.2d at 322.
, 96 S.Ct.
7. The second interrogation lasted approximately fifteen minutes. Id. at at 324, 46 L.Ed.2d at 318. At no time during either interrogation did Mosley indicate a desire
to consult a lawyer. Id. at -, 96 S.Ct. at 324, 46 L.Ed.2d at 318.
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ley's trial where he was convicted of first degree murder. The Michigan
Court of Appeals reversed the conviction holding that the second interrogation was a per se violation of the Miranda doctrine8 and in so holding, relied
heavily on Westover v. United States,I a companion case to Miranda. The
Michigan Supreme Court denied further appeal"0 and the United States
Supreme Court granted the state's petition for certiorari."
In the Miranda decision the Court stated that the basic purpose of its
holding was to set forth concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow. 2 Miranda did not state under what
circumstances, if any, a statement obtained after a person in custody 3 has
decided to remain silent would be admissible in evidence. The Miranda
decision simply stated :
Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the
individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At
this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment
privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without
the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation
operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked.14
Thus Miranda held that custody creates an inherent compulsion on an
individual to incriminate himself in response to questions, and that statements obtained under such circumstances are therefore obtained in violation of the fifth amendment privilege against compelled testimonial selfincrimination unless the privilege is "knowingly and intelligently
5
waived."
In Mosley the Court viewed the issue as being whether the conduct of
the police leading to the incriminating statement violated the Miranda
guidelines and, therefore, focused primarily on an interpretation of the
above stated passage of Miranda in resolving the issue." The Court set
forth three possible interpretations of how Miranda's language could operate after a suspect invoked his right to cut off questioning. First, the
language could be literally interpreted to grant the suspect permanent
8. 51 Mich. App. 105, 214 N.W.2d 564 (1974).
9. 384 U.S. at 494, 86 S.Ct. at 1638, 16 L.Ed.2d at 735 (1966).
10. 392 Mich. 764 (1974).
11. 419 U.S. 1119, 95 S.Ct. 801, 42 L.Ed.2d 819 (1975).

12.
13.

384 U.S. at 441-42, 86 S.Ct. at 1611, 16 L.Ed.2d at 705.
See Annot., Custodial Interrogation-MirandaRule, 31 A.L.R.3d 565 (1970).

14. 384 U.S. at 473-74, 86 S.Ct. at 1627-28, 16 L.Ed.2d at 23. The court in Mosley stated
that this passage was also relied on by the Michigan Court of Appeals in finding a per se
violation of Miranda. U.S. at _,
96 S.Ct. at 324, 46 L.Ed.2d at 319.
15. Id. at 471, 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1626, 1628, 16 L.Ed.2d at 722, 725.
16. __
U.S. at -, 96 S.Ct. at 324, 46 L.Ed.2d at 319.
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immunity from any further questioning by any police officer at any time
or place on any subject." A second possible interpretation could be the
exclusion of any statement taken after the suspect invokes the right to cut
off questioning. In other words, any subsequent statement would be characterized as the product of compulsion and be excluded from evidence,
even if the suspect volunteered the statement without any further interrogation by police.' 8 Finally, the Miranda language could be interpreted to
require the immediate cessation of interrogation when the right is invoked
by the suspect, but permitting a resumption of questioning after a momentary respite." All three interpretations were rejected by the Court as either
infringing too greatly on legitimate police investigative rights or violating
the purposes of Miranda by not adequately protecting the accused.' Instead, the Court relied on an interpretation of the intent of Miranda: first,
to adopt effective means to notify the person of his right of silence, and
second, to adopt effective means to assure that the exercise2 of that right
by the person in custody would be "scrupulously honored." '
The decision in Westover v. United States22 held an accused's statement
inadmissible under Miranda where the statement was obtained by authorities in a second interrogation. In Westover warnings were given to the
accused at the outset of the second interrogation but were not given to him
upon commencement of the initial questioning.23 The Mosley court found
this original failure to notify the accused of his fifth amendment right to
be the distinguishing factor between the different results reached in the
24
two cases.
The Mosley decision correctly interprets the intent of the Miranda
holding, but the test enunciated by the Court for determining the admissibility of statements obtained after a suspect exercises his right of silence
fails to meet the standard set forth in Miranda. In other words, the test
fails to set forth concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement
agencies and courts to follow. 2'5 Mosley rejects possible objective standards
for a standard based on the factual circumstances of each case-was the
right to cut off questioning "scrupulously honored"? Justice Brennan, dissenting, takes note of the majority's failure in this regard and also suggests
two objective guidelines available as proper procedural safeguards before
resumption of questioning: arraignment or appointment and arrival of
counsel.26 Use of such objective guidelines would provide much more effec17.
18.
19,
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

, 96 S.Ct. at 325, 46
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
96 S.Ct. at 326, 46
Id. at -'
384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16
Id. at 496-97, 86 S.Ct. at 1639,
, 96 S.Ct. at
__
U.S. at 384 U.S. at 441-42, 86 S.Ct. at
,96 S.Ct. at
U.S. at -

L.Ed.2d at 320.

L.Ed.2d at 321.
L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
16 L.Ed.2d at 736.
327, 46 L.Ed.2d at 323.
1611, 16 L.Ed.2d at 705.
332, 46 L.Ed.2d at 329.
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tive safeguards than a "scrupulously honored" test which again exposes an
accused to the potentiality of psychological and physical coercion inherent
in custodial interrogation which Miranda sought to expel.27 Determining
such factual questions as to whether the offense is unrelated"8 or whether
a substantial time has passed simply does not provide concrete constitutional safeguards as dictated by Miranda.
It would be a simple task to explain the Mosley decision as another
example 2' of the Burger Court's shifting the emphasis away from the Warren Court's protection of the rights of the accused to an emphasis on
protection of law enforcement officers and a reduction of the number of
criminal convictions being reversed on procedural technicalities. 0 The result reached in Mosley may well fit into this shift of emphasis, but a better
explanation of the decision is that the Court simply misinterpreted the
mandate of Miranda.
L. LIN WOOD, JR.
27. 384 U.S. at 456, 86 S.Ct. at 1618, 16 L.Ed.2d at 713.
28. It is interesting to note that Justice Brennan, dissenting, found troubling the fact that
Mosley initially indicated he did not want to answer "[alnything about robberies," therefore, raising a question of whether the second interrogation about a prior robbery-murder even
met the "scrupulously honored" test. U.S. at __, 96 S.Ct. at 334, 46 L.Ed.2d at 331.
29. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S. Ct. 643, 28 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1971) (statement
obtained in violation of Miranda was admissible for impeachment purposes).
30. Excellent commentaries on the Warren Court's performance include A. BICKEL, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970); F. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND
(1970); and P. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONsTrrurION AND THE WARREN COURT (1970). For
excellent discussions of the Burger Court and how it compares with the Warren Court see
Lamb, The Making of a Chief Justice: Warren Burger on Criminal Procedure, 1956-1969, 60
CORNELL L. REV. 743 (1975), and Stephens, The Burger Court: New Dimensions in Criminal
Justice, 60 GEORGETOWN L.J. 249 (1971).

